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Abstract
We propose a general model of oligopoly with firms relying on a two factor
production function. In a first stage, firms choose a certain fixed factor level. In
the second stage, firms compete on price, and adjust the variable factor to satisfy
all the demand. When the factors are substitutable, the capacity constraint is
“soft”, implying a convex cost function in the second stage. We show that there
exists a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies, whatever the
returns to scale. Among them a payoff-dominant one can always be selected.
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1 Introduction.
This article investigates price competition between a variable number of capacity con-
strained firms producing a homogeneous good. In our model, firms rely on a production
function with two substitutable factors that are chosen sequentially. The first factor,
chosen in a first stage, remains “fixed” in the second during which firms compete on
price and adjust the second “variable” factor to match their demand. In this setting,
the fixed factor can be seen as a capacity. This means that firms in our model are ca-
pacity constrained but that this constraint is “soft” because they can always increase
production beyond their optimal capacity, albeit at an increasing marginal production
cost. Our results are general: the production function can be of any form and returns
to scale do not have to be constant or decreasing.
The results are as follows. There is a continuum of subgame perfect Nash Equilibria
in pure strategies in which all firms operate the market at a high level of price, gener-
alizing the seminal one stage model of Dastidar (1995, 2001) in a two stage setting. A
payoff-dominant subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium can always be selected.
Moreover: 1) Because the short-run cost function is convex whatever the returns
to scale, the existence of an equilibrium for the whole game is disentangled from the
nature of the returns to scale, a result that has never been reported. 2) In the first
stage, there is a threshold for the fixed factor below which competitors can adopt limit
pricing strategies in the second stage, a property that will discipline the equilibrium
price, especially when the number of firms is low. 3) The equilibrium price appears to
increase with the number of firms, a theoretical result that has seldom been reported
when information is perfect (Rosenthal, 1980; Chen and Riordan, 2008; Gabaix et al.,
2016) and never been explained relying on supply-side argument.
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Related literature
This paper bridges three lines of literature, price competition with convex cost initi-
ated by Dixon (1987, 1990) and fully characterized by Dastidar (1995), the Bertrand-
Edgeworth constrained capacity approach to price competition, and the literature on
capacities and limit pricing strategies.
In his seminal model of price competition, Joseph Bertrand (1883) considered inter-
actions between two firms that have identical linear cost functions and simultaneously
set their prices. According to this model, even if the number of competing firms is
small, price competition leads to a perfectly competitive outcome in a market for an
homogeneous good. The unique equilibrium price equals the firms’ (constant and com-
mon) marginal cost and each firm’s profit is equal to zero. This result is referred as
the Bertrand Paradox. For a long time, following Edgeworth’s 1925 initial insight, the
belief was that there was a serious equilibrium existence problem (in pure strategies)
when considering decreasing returns to scale and/or convex cost functions. However,
Dastidar (1995) proved that a continuum of pure strategy Nash equilibria in price com-
petition does exist when costs are strictly convex. In this model, following Chamberlin
(1933), firms are assumed to match all incoming demand at the price that is announced.
As noted by Yano and Komatsubara (2017), this Dastidar-Chamberlin specification is
increasingly recognized as an important stream of literature.1 This assumption can be
justified by the existence of hidden cost for turning part of the demand away (Dixon,
1990).2 An other justification can be that, in many regulated market, the authority
obliged the firms to match all the incoming demand, with the idea that this rule will
protect the consumer (Spulber, 1989). It is thus interesting to understand how those
regulated market functions.
1See, among many others, Dastidar (1995, 2001, 2011b); Hoernig (2002); Chaudhuri (1996); Chowd-
hury (2009, 2002); Vives (1999); Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004); Novshek and Chowdhury (2003);
Bagh (2010); Routledge (2010).
2In markets with “drastic” capacity constraint (see below) the choice of turning part of the con-
sumer away is natural consequence of the choice of capacity in the first stage. In Dixon (1990) the
choice of the price and the choice of the quantity that will be offered to answer part of this demand
are simultaneous.
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With this assumption, a firm undercutting its rivals will attract all the demand
but, when the cost function is convex, this move may not necessarily be profitable. At
equilibrium therefore, prices may be higher than the average cost and even higher than
the marginal cost. Dastidar (2001) shows that, when the costs are sufficiently convex,
the collusive outcome may even be an equilibrium. On the contrary, with strictly
subadditive costs and symmetric firms, it can be shown that there is no equilibrium
in price competition (Dastidar, 2011b).3 The source of subadditivity can be either
increasing returns to scale or the existence of fixed costs when variable unitary costs
are constant or not too convex (Hoernig, 2007; Baye and Kovenock, 2008; Saporiti
and Coloma, 2010). In this Bertrand-Dastidar approach to price competition it is the
convexity of the cost function that resolves the Bertrand Paradox. As mentioned in the
introductory paragraph, in our model, the convexity of the short-run cost function in
the second stage is due to the decreasing marginal productivity of the variable factor.
Our model thus shares the main properties of the Dastidarian framework, and that,
whatever the returns to scale.
As pointed out by Vives (1999), following Edgeworth (1925), there is a long tradition
in Industrial Organization to solve the Bertrand Paradox by considering that firms are
constrained by their production capacities when matching the incoming demand. In
the modern literature, this argument has been put forward by Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983), among others. In a two-stage game, they obtain that quantity pre-commitment,
in the first stage, and price competition, in the second, sustain the Cournot outcome
provided the constrained capacities are not “too high”. As shown by Davidson and
Deneckere (1986), this result is sensitive to the choice of a rationing rule for the residual
demand (see Vives, 1999, p.124, for details). This result is built on “drastic” capacity
constraints, that is, the marginal cost of production in excess of capacity is infinite.
Our approach relies on the same type of two stage game with capacity chosen in the
3Dastidar (2011a) introduces asymmetric cost functions and proves that, in this case, when the
monopoly break-even prices differ, an equilibrium can be found even if costs are strictly subadditive.
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first. However, the softness of the capacity constraint induces a smoother cost function
in the second stage. Less-rigid capacity constraints have been introduced previously in
a number of studies (see Maggi, 1996; Boccard and Wauthy, 2000, 2004; Chowdhury,
2009, for example) directly in the cost function. Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014)
have established a rigorous basis for such “soft” capacity constraints starting from
the microeconomic production function and production factors chosen sequentially.
Burguet and Sákovics (2017) follow the same approach, but with a very different model
of price competition in the second stage, whereby firms can tailor their prices to each
consumer.
Beyond the issue of price competition, strategic investment capacity decisions are
also a very classical question in industrial organization with regard to entry deterrence
(Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980, among many others). In this kind of model, choosing an
excess capacity in the first stage drives away potential competitors. In our model, all
the competitors are already operating in the market. However, a firm that chooses
too low a capacity in the first stage will be unable to match its competitors’ prices
profitably in the second. Firms must therefore choose a high enough capacity to avoid
limiting their pricing strategies in the second stage.
In this context, we propose a model of price competition with “soft” capacity con-
straints that extends in many dimensions Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014). We
adopt a very general, non parametric, production function instead of a Cobb-Douglas
one. Second, we consider the possibility for the returns to scale to be decreasing or
increasing instead of being only constant. Third, we consider an oligopoly instead of
duopoly, allowing the effects on the market price of the number of firms to be investi-
gated. Notably, we find that when there are few firms in the market, the equilibrium
price can increase when new firms enter whatever the returns to scale. While the con-
cept of price-increasing competition is not new to the literature (Rosenthal, 1980; Chen
and Riordan, 2008; Gabaix et al., 2016), our model highlights a simple explanation for
this phenomenon: cost convexity combined with endogenous capacities induces a “ca-
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pacity effect” that can offset the negative effect on prices of additional competing firms.
When more firms operate in the market, the level of the fixed factor (capacity) tends
to decrease and the stronger convexity of the cost function increases the equilibrium
price.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 rigourously characterizes the notion
of “soft” capacity constraints; the complete model is solved in Section 3; in Section 4
finally, a general method for numerical simulations is presented along with a “textbook
example” to illustrate some interesting properties.
2 Characterization of soft capacity constraints
Firms produce a homogeneous good using the same technology represented by a two
factor production function. The factors are chosen sequentially. We denote z the level
of the factor chosen in the first stage (the fixed factor) and v, the level of the factor
(the variable factor) chosen in the second stage. We denote y the level of production,
and f : R2+ → R+, giving:
y = f(z, v) (1)
The only assumptions are that z is an essential production factor (f(0, v) = 0 for all
v) and f increases with z and v, shows decreasing marginal factor productivity, and is
quasi-concave. Thus: fz > 0, fv > 0, fzz < 0, fvv < 0 and−fzzf 2v +2fzvfvfz−fvvf 2z > 0.
It is important to emphasize that we make no general assumptions about the nature of
the returns to scale or the level of substitutability between the two production factors.
When z is fixed, Equation (1) defines the variable factor as an implicit function of z
and y, v̂(y, z).
Lemma 1. 1) The function v̂ is quasi-convex and fulfils:
v̂y(y, z) =
1
fv(z, v)
> 0 (2)
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v̂z(y, z) = −
fz(z, v)
fv(z, v)
< 0 (3)
v̂yy(y, z) = −
fvv(z, v)v̂y(y, z)
fv(z, v)2
> 0 (4)
v̂zz(y, z) =
−fzzf 2v + 2fzvfvfz − fvvf 2z
fv(z, v)3
> 0 (5)
v̂yz(y, z) = v̂zy(y, z) = −
fvz(z, v) + v̂z(y, z)fvv(z, v)
fv(z, v)2
< 0 (6)
2) Moreover, if f is (strictly) concave then v̂ is (strictly) convex.
Proof: In the Appendix A.1 
We can therefore define the cost as a function of (y, z). With w1,the price of factor z
and w2, the price of the factor v, we have:
C(y, z) = w1z︸︷︷︸
FC(z)
+w2v̂(y, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V C(y,z)
(7)
Setting the level of the fixed factor corresponds to choosing a capacity. In this
model, it is possible to match any incoming demand but at an increasing marginal
cost. It is in this way that the capacity constraint is”soft”. The sequential choice of
production factors implies that the cost function is convex, whatever the returns to
scale. Thus, when firms compete on price in the second stage, our model inherits the
general properties of the Dastidarian framework.
It is noteworthy that as always, the fixed cost depends on the level of the fixed
factor, but so does the variable cost. The level chosen for the capacity will have
qualitative implications for the shape of the variable cost function. Models that start
from an arbitrary cost function usually miss this effect.
Finally, it is important to notice that the softness of the capacity constraint comes
from the substitutability of the production factor. As pointed out by Cabon-Dhersin
and Drouhin (2014, p. 428) and Burguet and Sákovics (2017), if the production factors
are fully complementary (Leontief technology), our approach is equivalent to the usual
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“drastic” capacity constraint.
3 Equilibrium of the game
Firms first set their fixed factor to a certain level then compete on price in a second
stage (they can observe the level of fixed factor played by other firms in the first
stage). The demand of the whole market is continuous, twice differentiable, decreasing
and admits a choke-price4
D : R+ −→ R+ with D′(p) ≤ 0, D(pmax) = 0, D(0) = Qmax.
The strategic variable for the firms in stage 2 is price. We denote pi the price of firm
i and ~p = (p1, .., pn), the vector of prices of all the n firms in the market. We denote
pL = Min{p1, .., pn} and we define the set M = {j ∈ {1, .., n}|pj = pL}. We denote
m = Card(M) the number of firms quoting the lowest price. Firms have to supply all
the demand they face in stage 2 at price pi. The demand function of firm i is defined
as follows:
Di(~p) =

0 if pi > pL
D(pi)
m
if pi = pL
We can now express the profit πi of each firm i, when m firms operate in the market
(set the lowest price).
πi(~p, zi) = pDi(~p)− w1zi − w2v̂ (Di(~p), zi)
4A shown by Saporiti and Coloma (2010), Table 1, pp 4-5, the assumption of a choke-price is
very standard in the literature. It is especially the case in the Dastidarian tradition with convex
costs in which the assumption facilitates the proof of the existence of the thresholds in price that will
be crucial in the reasoning. The main drawback is that it prevents the use of the simple iso-elastic
demand function. However, in the standard case of Bertrand competition with constant marginal cost,
Baye and Morgan (1999), in opposition with Harrington (1989), proved that the assumption can be
critical: “when the absence of choke-price gives rise to an unbounded monopoly profit”, any positive
(but finite) payoff vector can be achieved in a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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πi(~p, zi) =

−w1zi if pi > pL
pD(p)
m
− w1zi − w2v̂
(
D(p)
m
, zi
)
def
= π̂(p, zi,m) if pi = pL = p
The function π̂(p, zi,m) represents the profit of firm i when m firms (including firm
i) quote the lowest price, p. This function depends on the level of the fixed factor set
in the first stage of the game. The assumptions described above for the production
function are sufficient to ensure that π̂zz < 0. However, even if the profit is necessarily
concave in y, this does not guarantee that π̂ is strictly concave in p. This occurs if the
demand function is not too concave or too convex:
−D
′(p)2
m
v̂yy
v̂y
(
D(p)
m
, z
)
< D′′(p) < −2D
′(p)
p
(8)
The left-hand side of the inequality corresponds to the sufficient condition for the short
run cost to be convex in p and the right-hand side is the sufficient condition for the
revenue function to be concave in p.5 Moreover, if we want this condition to hold
whatever the number of firms, in particular when this number grows to infinity, the
left-hand side should tend to zero and the demand function has to be convex (non-
strictly).
To solve the equilibrium of the game in stage 2, the first step is to test whether
firm i can deviate profitably from an outcome in which m firms (including firm i)
quote the same price. The following two thresholds are defined with this purpose
in mind. The first, p̄, is the maximum price for which firms cannot increase their
profits by unilaterally lowering their prices. The second, p̂, is the minimum price
for which firms cannot increase their profits by unilaterally increasing their prices.
In the traditional Bertrand competition model with constant average/marginal costs,
these two thresholds are equal and correspond to the unique equilibrium of the game,
implying marginal cost pricing. In our more general setting with a convex short-run
5This is a standard assumption to make, even if when starting directly from a cost function, it is
hidden within the general assumption that the profit function is concave in p.
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cost function, as in Dastidar (1995), the two thresholds are never equal and define a
price interval for each firm for which there is no profitable deviation.
Let us start by studying a firm’s ability to increase its profit by undercutting
its competitors. For that purpose we define, for m > 2, the function Ω(p, z,m)
def
=
π̂(p, z, 1)− π̂(p, z,m). Ω can be interpreted as the incentive for a firm to lower its price
when the market price is p. Thus when Ω ≤ 0, it is not profitable for the firm to lower
its price while when Ω > 0, it is profitable for the firm to do so.
Lemma 2. For a given z and m, there is a unique threshold p̄(z,m) ∈ (0, pmax) that
solves Ω(p, z,m) = 0
When p ≤ p̄, Ω(p, z,m) ≤ 0 and when p > p̄, Ω(p, z,m) > 0
Proof: In the Appendix A.2 
p̄(z,m) is the highest price with no incentive to deviate when m firms operate the
market. It can be shown that this price is necessarily higher than the marginal cost (it
follows directly from inequality (16) in the Appendix A.2).
We can now study the possibility for a firm to increase its profit by increasing its
price. This case is much simpler because in the second stage, the fixed cost, w1z, is
sunk, and the firm is only motivated to produce if the variable part of the profit is
positive. If this is not the case at the current price, p, increasing the price will induce
zero demand for the firm and thus zero production and will reduce its losses.
Lemma 3. For a given z and m ≥ 1, there is a unique p̂(z,m) in the interval (0, pmax)
for which: π̂(p̂, z,m) = −w1z
Moreover, π̂(p̂, z,m) decreases with m and p̄(z,m) > p̂(z,m).
Proof: In the Appendix A.3 
For a given z, p̂(z,m) is the minimum price that motivates production in the second
stage when m firms operate in the market.
The price interval [p̂(z,m), p̄(z,m)] is crucial to solving for the equilibrium of the
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game in stage 2. These prices will have to be compared with the purely collusive price,
p∗, when m firms operate in the market.
Lemma 4. For a given z and m ≥ 1, there is a unique p∗(z,m) in the interval (0, pmax)
for which p∗(z,m)
def
= arg max
p
{π̂(p, z,m)}
Moreover, p∗(z,m) > p̂(z,m).
Proof: In the Appendix A.4 
A simple interpretation is that this is the collusive price when all firms chose to set
their fixed factor to the same level in the first stage (when m = 1, it is the monopoly
price). We will see that p∗ can fall within [p̂(z,m), p̄(z,m)], but not necessarily.
Lemma 5. ∀m ∈ [1, n], p̂(z,m), p̄(z,m) and p∗(z,m) are strictly decreasing in z and
m over their respective domains.
Proof: In the Appendix A.5 
At this point, it is important to remark that, in the following, z will be endogenous,
while m will remain exogenous, and that, every things else being equal, a higher number
of firms will tend to diminish the demand for each firm and thus the level of fixed factor
required to match it. Thus Lemma 5 describes, at the same time, the direct effect of
a higher m on all the three thresholds in price, p̂, p̄, p∗ and an indirect effect through
the endogenous diminution of z that will play in the opposite direction. Moreover, it
is obvious that the effect of a unitary increase in the number of firms on each firm’s
demand, and thus on z, will be much higher when this number is low, as well as the
intensity of the indirect effect.
We have now gathered all the elements required to characterize the equilibrium
prediction for the whole game.
Each firm i chooses a pure strategy (zi, pi) in R+ × [0, pmax], played sequentially.
We are searching for outcomes of the game (~z, ~p) in R+n× [0, pmax]n that are Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in which all the n firms operate in the market at
the same price. For doing that we rely only on the definition of Nash equilibrium, and
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check for the non existence of profitable deviation in every subgames and for the whole
game (cf. Methodological statement in the Appendix B).
Proposition 1. The three following conditions are necessary for an outcome of the
game (~p, ~z) in which all the n firms operate in the market at the same price pN to be a
SPNE:
1. Optimal level of fixed factor: All n firms set their fixed factor to the same
level, zN = z∗(pN , n), with z∗(p, n) being a solution of the program:
P1 (p, n)
 maxz π̂(p, z, n)s.t. p ≤ p̄(z, n)
2. Profitability: π̂(pN , zN , n) ≥ 0
3. Non-existence of limit pricing strategies:
π̂(pN , zN , n) ≥ π̂(p̂(zN , n), argmax
z
π̂(p̂(zN , n), z, 1), 1)
Proof: In the Appendix B.1 
Each condition corresponds to a type of deviation in the whole game (a deviation
that can concern both z and p). Among those possible deviations, condition 1 focused
on unidimensional deviations in z, i.e. deviations that can preserve the same price as an
equilibrium in the second stage. Because of the multiplicity of equilibria in the second
stage, a same equilibrium price can be sustained by a continuum of z. Of course, among
this continuum only the z that maximizes the profit will be non-dominated by that
kind of deviation. That is the spirit of program P1 (p, n), the constraint of this program
delimiting the right bound of the continuum. It means that, when the constraint is
binding, the capacity z solution of program P1 (p, n) will be lower than the optimal z
of the unconstrained program.
Program P1 (p, n) plays a central role in all the reasoning of this article. An impor-
tant property of the program is that its solution is always unique, thanks to the strict
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concavity of the profit function π̂ with regard to z. Thus, for a given number of firms,
n, there exists a bi-univocal decreasing relation between z and p, i.e. z∗(p, n). Only
couple in which p ∈ [0, pmax] and z = z∗(p, n) satisfies condition 1. and SPNE are to
be searched within the reduced set of outcomes satisfying this condition for all players.
The associated profit for each firm will thus be:
Π(pN , n)
def
= π(pN , z∗(pN , n), n) (9)
Condition 2 is quite simple, a firm playing z = 0 and p = pmax will always obtain
zero profit. So an outcome that brings negative profit will always be eliminated by
that kind of deviation when considering the whole game.
Finally condition 3 considers possible deviations, in which a firm massively invests in
the fixed factor, and sets, in the second stage, a low price that will not be sustainable by
rivals6. That kind of deviations will be especially profitable for outcomes characterized
by a low level of fixed factor for all firms. It is particularly the case for outcomes
fulfilling condition 1, when the constraint of program P1 (p, n) is binding.
A comparison can be made with models in which firms choose simultaneously the
price and the capacity as in Dixon (1990). In these models, firms choose the price
and the capacity that maximizes the profit for this price without any constraint. In
our model, the sequential nature of the game adds a constraint to the program that
will be binding when the considered price is “high”. For a given z, pN has to be a
Nash Equilibrium in the second stage, implying that z cannot be “too high”. That’s
the spirit of Condition 1. As stated before, when the constraint is binding, the level
of fixed factor is sub-optimal, high prices can only be sustained with a lower level of
fixed factor. But if the level of fixed factor is too low, then limit pricing strategies
become possible, excluding the possibility for this outcome to be SPNE of the game.
That’s the Spirit of condition 3. We will see in the calibrated textbook example of
6Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014) overlooked the possibility of limit pricing strategies in the
model, and thus was unable to identify the effect.
13
Section 4, that, due to this “capacity effect”, an increase of the number of firm may
change this balance. The threshold in price above which the constraint of program
(P1) is binding will increase with the number of firms, limiting the profitability of limit
pricing strategies. Thus potentially higher prices may be sustained as equilibria when
the number of firms increases.
It is important to notice that Proposition 1 characterises only some necessary con-
ditions for an outcome of the game to be a SPNE.
Proposition 2. An outcome of the game that fulfils all three necessary conditions of
Proposition 1 and such that:
∀p ∈ [p̂(zN , n), pN),Π(pN , n) ≥ Π(p, n)
is a SPNE of the whole game.
Proof: In the Appendix B.2. 
Proposition 2 considers the remaining possible deviations in which a firm deviates
by increasing its level of fixed factor slightly, but sufficiently to exclude the initial level
of price pN from the range of Nash equilibria in the second stage. But to associate a
profit to that kind of deviation, firms should be able to predict what equilibrium will
be selected in the second stage. For allowing that, it will be convenient to complete
Subgame-perfection by some mechanism of equilibrium selection, or assumptions on
firms beliefs or expectations to predict what will happen in the second stage.
However, when the condition of Proposition 2 is fulfilled, whatever the possible
Nash selected in the second stage when considering that kind of unilateral deviation,
profit is lower. And, if firms do not coordinate, profit is also lower for the deviating
firm. We can thus conclude that in this special case, that corresponds to prices that are
associated with the increasing part of the function Π we do not nead supplementary
assumption to obtain a SPNE. When the condition is not fulfilled, corresponding to
price associated with the strictly decreasing part of the function Π. Subgame perfection
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is not powerful enough to conclude.
Proposition 3. The unique outcome in which all n firms choose the same fixed factor
level, zC, in the first stage and quote the same price, pC, in the second, with pC being
a solution of the program,
(P2)

max
p
π̂(p, z, n)
s.t. zC
def
= z = argmax {P1(p, n)}
π̂(p, z, n) ≥ 0
π̂(p, z, n) ≥ π̂(p̂(z, n), argmax
z̃
π̂(p̂(z, n), z̃, 1), 1)
is a SPNE of the game.
Moreover, π̂(zC , pC) is the Payoff Dominant SPNE of the game. More generally, it
dominates all the outcomes that satisfy the necessary conditions of Proposition 1.
Proof: Because all firms have the same technology, it is obvious that any (p, z)
that fulfil the constraints of Program P2, also fulfils the three necessary constraints
of Proposition 1. Moreover, thanks to the envelop theorem, the solution of program
P2, also fulfils the supplementary condition of Proposition 2. Because, of the strict
concavity of the profit function π̂ with regards to p, stemming from Equation (8), this
solution is unique. It follows that, by construction, (pC , zC) is the Payoff Dominant
SPNE. 
In the remainder of the article, we will consider (pC , zC) to be the unique and
symmetric predictable outcome of the price competition game with soft capacity con-
straints. As pointed out by Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014), the solution of program
(P2) is collusive by nature (i.e. it corresponds to a joint profit maximisation program).
When neither of the constraints on programs (P1) and (P2) are binding, the predictable
outcome will verify pC = p∗(zC , n), with p∗ defined as in Lemma 4. In this case the
predictable outcome is fully collusive. When the constraint on Program (P1) is binding
(i.e. no profitable deviation in stage 2, p ≤ p̄(z, n) ), then pC = p̄(zC , n), a price that is
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necessarily higher than marginal cost, as noted in the comment of Lemma 2. For this
reason we will name this case “weakly collusive”, because this situation is character-
ized by a mark-up that is strictly positive but lower than in the “fully collusive case”.
However, as proved in Proposition 3, this “collusive” solution is a Subgame Perfect
Nash equilibrium, a result that is very unusual in a non-repeated game.
It should be emphasized however, that, beside the more general setting of the
problem, the strategy for proving the result in the present paper is also completely
different. Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014) solve the continuum of Nash equilibria
in the second stage, then apply a first time payoff dominance, then move backward to
the resolution of the first stage, and apply for a second time payoff dominance. In this
paper we solve directly the whole game for the SPNE and then apply payoff dominance
once. The method is not only more parsimonious, but it allows to understand that the
collusive nature of the predictable outcome is not a simple tautology resulting from
the use of payoff dominance, but is a natural extension of program (P1), a necessary
condition for having a SPNE.
4 A textbook example
The model in this article is built on very general assumptions: two substitutable factors
chosen sequentially, a quasi-concave production function, decreasing marginal factor
productivity. Propositions (1) and (3) show that the equilibrium prediction for the
whole game can be seen as a solution to a maximisation program subject to three
different inequality constraints. We can exploit this unusual and remarkable property
to compute equilibrium predictions of parametrical versions of price competition models
with soft capacity constraints.
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4.1 General procedure and parametrization
In this section, we provide a general procedure to compute equilibria and apply it
to solve a simple parametrical example numerically as a “textbook case”, assuming a
Cobb-Douglas production function and linear demand.
The production function is:
f(z, v) = A
(
z1−αvα
)ρ
(10)
with ρ > 0, the scale elasticity of production, and, ρα < 1 and ρ (1− α) < 1 because
of the decreasing marginal factor productivity. In general of course, the Cobb-Douglas
production function is quasi-concave. It will be concave when ρ = 1 (constant returns to
scale) and strictly concave when ρ < 1 (decreasing returns to scale). Taking y = f(z, v),
the function v̂ is easily obtained by direct calculation:
v̂(y, z) =
y
1
αρ
A
1
αρ z
1−α
α
(11)
Thus, when n firms operate in the market, the function π̂ can be written:
π̂(p, z, n) = p
D(p)
n
− w1z − w2
y
1
αρ
A
1
αρ z
1−α
α
(12)
The demand function is assumed to be linear:
D(p) = b(pmax − p) (13)
with b > 0. We will show that although the assumptions are simple, they are suf-
ficient to demonstrate the full richness of our theoretical framework. We take the
Payoff dominant subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of Proposition (3) - the solution
of programme (P2)- as the predictable outcome of our general model of price compe-
tition with soft capacity constraints. But because the “non-existence of limit pricing
strategies” condition can be tricky to deal with directly, we will proceed sequentially.
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Step 1. We solve program (P1) for a given number of firms, n, a given price p ∈
(0, pmax), and a given vector of parameters (α, ρ, A, b, w1, w2), and obtain z
∗(p, n)
the level of the fixed factor that efficiently sustains price p. We are thus able
to calculate Π(p, n) = π̂(p, z∗(p, n), n).
Step 2. For a given n, the process in step 1 can be repeated for any p ∈ (0, pmax). So
we are able to draw Π(p, n) as a function of p point by point.
Step 3. The profitability condition Π(p, n) ≥ 0 can be tested for each point (p,Π(p, n))
calculated in Step 2.
Step 4. For each point (p,Π(p, n)) calculated in Step 2, we can calculate p̂(z∗(p, n), n)
and then test for the non-existence of limit pricing strategies: π̂(p, z∗(p, n), n) ≥
π̂(p̂(z∗(p, n), n), argmax
z̃
π̂(p̂(z∗(p, n), n), z̃, 1), 1).
Step 5. For each point (p,Π(p, n)) calculated in Step 2, we can check if the non prof-
itable deviation in stage 2 condition is binding or not.
Step 6. For each point (p,Π(p, n)) calculated in Step 2, we can check if the condition
of Proposition 2 is binding or not. In practice it means that all the points
in the decreasing part of Π(p, n) cannot be SPNE.
Step 7. Among all the (p,Π(p, n)) that satisfy the profitability test in Step 3 and
the non-existence of limit pricing strategies test in Step 4, we search for
the price that provides the highest profit, which is pC , the equilibrium price
solution of (P2). If in Step 5 the non profitable deviation in stage 2
condition is binding, pC = p̄(z∗(pC , n), n), otherwise, pC = p∗(z∗(pC , n), n).
For a given number of firms and all prices, the constraints of Program (P2) can all be
binding or slack. In each case, there will be a threshold price delimiting the subdomain
in which each constraint is binding. We will denote: p̃(n) = p̄(z∗(p, n), n), the threshold
above which profitable deviations are excluded in the second stage; p0(n), the threshold
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above which firms earn a positive profit; pL(n), the threshold above which a fixed factor
can be chosen in the first stage that can make limit pricing strategies profitable in the
second, and, finally, p1(n) the threshold above which Π(p, n) is decreasing in p.
Consider the following numerical example.7 Figure 1 shows the behavior predicted
for a duopoly (n=2), with constant returns to scale (ρ=1), α = .7, pmax = 10, and all
the other parameters normalized to 1.
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Figure 1: The SPNE interval for price (plain red) and associated fixed factor levels
when ρ = 1, α = .7, n = 2, w1=1, w2=1.
The lower graphic represents z∗(p, n) the solution of the Program (P1) i.e. the
efficient level of the fixed factor taking into account the non profitable deviation
in stage 2 constraint. For p ≤ p̃, the constraint is slack. Of course, z∗ decreases as p
7Numerical simulations were performed using Wolfram Research Mathematica 11. The optimiza-
tion programs were solved numerically using the NMaximize function and the value of p̂(z∗(p, n), n)
was obtained using the Findroot function.
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increases, converging to zero as p tends to pmax. Conversely, for p ≥ p̃, the constraint
is binding (p = p̄(z∗, n)). It will become apparent that a binding constraint implies a
much lower level of z for a given price.
The upper graph in Figure 1 shows the whole function Π(p, n) = π̂(p, z∗(p, n), n)
for p ∈ (0, pmax). The left dotted part, for p ∈ (0, p0), corresponds to negative profits.
This price interval can therefore not be a SPNE of the two-stage game. The right part
of the curve (in black) does not fulfil the non-existence of limit pricing strategies
condition (verified in Step 4 of our procedure), and cannot correspond either to a
SPNE. Consequently, the remaining (red) part of the curve corresponds to values of p
for which both the profitability, non-existence of limit pricing strategies and
Propositon 2 conditions are fulfilled. This means that all (p, z) pairs for which p
belongs to [p0, pC ] and z = z∗(p, n) are SPNE of the two-stage game. It is easy to
check that pC corresponds to the “Payoff dominant” SPNE of the whole game (the
solution of program (P2)). With this vector of parameters, we can see that the price
p1 that maximizes Π(p, n) does not correspond to a SPNE (note that the Π function
is defined in step 1 of our general procedure).
Effect of the convexity of the variable cost
The convexity of the cost function in the second stage is a crucial feature of our model.
With a Cobb-Douglas production function, this convexity in the second stage (with z
fixed) is determined by the product of α and ρ. When αρ tends to one, the variable cost
function becomes linear. For a given level of scale elasticity, ρ, a lower α corresponds
to a “more convex” production function.
Figure 2 shows the effect of different levels of convexity on the equilibrium prediction
of the whole game when five firms operate in the market.
In the upper graphic, α = .45, meaning that the variable cost function is highly
convex. In this case, p̃ is higher. The more convex variable cost function implies that
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price deviation in the second stage is more costly (here, with five firms, the deviating
firm will have to produce approximatively five times more.) Thus, pC and pL differ
from p̄, and the corresponding z∗ will be higher. This is why pL > p1 = pC . The
maximum of Π(p, n) corresponds to the solution of Program (P2).
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Figure 2: Effect of α on the SPNE interval for price (plain red) (ρ = 1, n = 5, w1=1,
w2=1).
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In the middle graphic, with α = .6, p̃ is now lower than p1 and pL = pC . p1 and
pL = pC are thus p̄, meaning that the non profitable deviation condition in the second
stage is binding (implying that zC is much lower). At p1, limit pricing strategies are
profitable (p1 > pL); p1 is not a SPNE. This is why pC = pL is the highest possible
profit in the absence of of limit pricing strategies.
The lower graph shows that the behavior is similar with α = .75, with pC being
much more lower than p1. The non-existence of limit pricing strategies constraint
excludes more than half of the prices between p0 and p1 from being SPNE.
Finally, in this example, when α→ 0.45→ 0.6→ 0.75, pC → 6→ 5.58→ 3.51 and
zC → 0.88 → 0.42 → 0.20: the lower the convexity is, the lower the equilibrium price
is. The effect on the level of the fixed factor is more complex to analyze. A lower price
implies a higher demand and thus, all things being equal, optimally requires a higher
fixed factor to produce. However, a higher α implies that the production process uses
the variable factor more intensively, and thus that z is lower. Moreover, when the “non
profitable deviation in the second stage” condition is binding, the optimal level of z
(the solution of program P1) is much lower (cf. Figure 1).
The same method can be used to study the effect of all parameters other than the
number of firms.
Effect of the number of firms and of returns to scale
We will now study how the price varies with the number of firms. We will show that
the nature of the returns to scale has a qualitative impact on this relation.
Considering constant returns to scale first, Figure 3 shows the equilibrium prediction
of pC as a function of the number of firms when ρ = 1, α = 0.7, w1=1, and w2=1.
Two important thresholds are apparent. When the number of firms is low (between
2 and n0), the non-existence of limit pricing strategies constraint is binding.
The lower n is, the more effective this constraint is, meaning that the pL(n) = pC
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threshold increases with n. From n = n0 onwards, the non-existence of limit pricing
strategies constraint is no longer binding. Between n0 and ñ, the non-profitable
deviation constraint is binding. The corresponding prices are p̄. The higher n is, the
less effective this constraint is. Prices continue to increase with n. Beyond ñ, none
of the constraints are binding at equilibrium. pC corresponds to a purely collusive
outcome. Because of the constant returns to scale, the market price pC is independent
of the size of the firm and thus of the number of firms sharing the market.
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Figure 3: Effect of the number of firms on equilibrium prices (ρ = 1, α = 0.7, w1=1,
w2=1).
This result is very unusual! When the number of firms is lower than ñ, the price
increases with the number of firms. This is still because the cost function is convex. In
our model, any firm that deviates (either in the second stage by lowering its price or in
the first stage by following a limit pricing strategy in z) will capture the entire market
(i.e. operate in the market alone). The increase in production is proportional to the
number of firms. Because of the convexity of the variable cost, the higher the increase
in production is, the lower the incentive to deviate is. However, a convex short-run
cost function does not guarantee that the price increases with the number of firms. As
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shown in Lemma 5, and also by Dastidar (2001), for a given z, p̂, p̄ and p∗ decrease
with n. It is the endogeneity of z, a specificity of our model, that adds a “capacity
effect” that overcomes the direct effect of n on p for a given z. At equilibrium, z will
tend to decrease with n and will, according to Lemma 5, have an indirect positive effect
on p. As shown in the lower part of figure 1 this effect of z on p dominates when the
constraint p ≤ p̄ is binding.
Let us now consider the limit case in which the number of firms tends to infinity.
Because of the homotheticity of the Cobb-Douglass function, the size and market share
of each firm will tend to zero. However, the price will remain at the fully collusive level,
significantly higher than the constant long-run average/marginal cost. The markup will
remain strictly positive and, because of the constancy of the returns to scale, constant
(i.e. never tending to zero). In our oligopoly model, perfect competition does not
appear as an asymptotic property when the number of firms tends to infinity.
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Figure 4: Effect of the number of firms on equilibrium prices (ρ = 0.9, α = 0.7,w1=1 ,
w2=1).
Considering now decreasing returns to scale (ρ = 0.9) with all the other parameters
left unchanged, the properties represented in Figure 4 are similar to those shown in
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Figure 3. The only difference is that in Figure 4 the right part of the curve (in red)
decreases as the number of firms increases. This is a direct effect of the decreasing
returns to scale. Smaller firms will be more efficient and will have an interest, when
the outcome is purely collusive, in sustaining slightly lower prices.
Figure 5 illustrates the case of increasing returns to scale (ρ = 1.02). The lower
envelop of the three curves on the left-hand side of the figure (up to n1) follows the
same trend as described above for the corresponding parts of Figures 3 and 4, with the
purely collusive part (in red, between ñ and n1) being slightly increasing because of
the increasing returns to scale (a greater number of smaller firms sharing the market
is less efficient). The novelty is that beyond the n1 threshold, the non-existence of
limit pricing strategies constraint becomes binding again. Limit pricing strategies
are more efficient because of the increasing returns to scale. Beyond n1, this gain is
sufficient to cancel the effect of the convexity of the variable cost function described
previously.
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Figure 5: Effect of the number of firms on equilibrium prices(ρ = 1.02, α = 0.7, w1 = 1,
w2 = 1).
This last figure illustrates a very original property of our general model of price
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competition: there is an equilibrium even when returns to scale are increasing. As
already pointed out in the introduction, this result stems from the sequential choice of
production factors which makes the short-run cost convex in the second stage whatever
the returns to scale. With a homogeneous single product, the long-run cost is clearly
subadditive when returns are increasing. But in our model, in contrast with Dastidar’s
2011b, this does not entail the existence of an equilibrium because the production
factors are chosen sequentially and because the fixed factor z is set endogenously. It
is noteworthy that the case of increasing returns to scale (or more generally, of cost
subadditivity) is usually associated with the notion of a natural monopoly. In the
contestable market theory (Baumol and Willig, 1981; Baumol et al., 1988), the threat
of entry is assumed to be sufficient to drive the price down to the average cost with a
single firm operating in the market. As pointed out by Tirole (1988) (p. 310) contestable
market theory has been seen as a “generalisation of Bertrand competition to markets
with increasing returns to scale”. Our general model of price competition with soft
capacity constraints clearly refutes this claim. Not only can more than one firm operate
in the market when returns are increasing, but they do so with positive profits and
potentially high markups. Thus, in presence of increasing returns to scale, a market
driven by price competition with soft capacity constraints suffers simultaneously from
market inefficiency (existence of a markup) and production inefficiency (the average
cost is not minimum).
The same general pattern occurs in all the different cases of returns to scale that
has already been analyzed for constant returns to scale. Because of a “capacity effect”,
before a threshold number of firms, ñ, is reached, the price increases with the number
of firms. Beyond this threshold, prices can decrease both when the returns to scale are
decreasing (because of the collusive nature of the outcome) and when they are increas-
ing (because of the combined effect of the non-existence of limit pricing strategies and
technological inefficiencies). The general model of price competition that we propose
accounts for high markups that can increase with the number of firms. Gabaix et al.
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(2016) obtained the same pattern for a homogeneous-good market but based on a very
different model with random utility. These authors surveyed the empirical literature
on this phenomenon.
5 Conclusion
The general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints we propose is a
simple and natural extension of existing studies of price competition that bridges three
lines of literature: capacity constraints, cost convexity and limit pricing strategies. We
show that an equilibrium prediction in pure strategies exists whatever the number of
firms and the nature of the returns to scale. This equilibrium prediction is characterized
by high markups and prices that can increase with the number of firms in the market.
It is the balance between the “natural” feature of this extension and its paradoxical
outcome that is the principle contribution of our work.
As economists, we have been taught that price competition is stronger than quantity
competition and also that tacit collusion can only result from threats and retaliation
in a dynamic setting when firms are not too numerous. Our model clearly undermines
these ideas in a very general framework, starting from a production function that is
only required to be quasi-concave with decreasing factor marginal productivity.
The core property of the model is summarized in Propositions 1 and 2 in section 3.
The predictable non-cooperative outcome of a non-repeated game of price competition
with soft capacity constraints is equivalent to the solution of a joint profit maximization
program.
This result is very unusual and it is important to understand the special mechanism
that operates behind the scene. In the second stage, for a given soft capacity (i.e. a
given level of the fixed factor), because of the Dastidarian property of the model stem-
ming from a convex short-run cost function, there is a continuum of Nash Equilibria
in prices. A direct reverse implication is that there is a continuum of levels of the fixed
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factor (chosen in the first stage) that lead to the same price equilibrium in the second.
Thus, for a given price in the second stage, it can be profitable for firms to deviate
in the first from any fixed factor level that is not the one that maximizes the profit
for that price, as long as this price remains sustainable as a Nash equilibrium in the
second stage. It is thus the combination of a sequential choice of production factors
with the continuum of Nash equilibria in the second stage that is at the origin of the
joint profit maximisation property described in Proposition 3.
This has two important consequences. First, from a positive point of view, this
property can be used to compute the equilibrium of the game. In general, studies of
price competition are cursed by discontinuities, making it impossible to use standard
reasoning based on continuous reaction functions to compute the equilibrium. The
general methodology provided in section 4 offers a much more tractable method to
compute the predictable outcome of the price competition game. Second, from a nor-
mative point of view, this outcome, which can be termed “collusive”, is obtained in
a non-cooperative framework, generalizing the claim of Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin
(2014) that the model offers an alternative mechanism for tacit collusion.
However, as general it is, our model relies on a number of assumptions that are
debatable. Of course, as is always the case for Bertrand-Dastidar competition, the
assumption that firms are committed to satisfying all incoming demand is a limit that
has been commented upon at length. On the one hand, if we consider, as Dixon (1990),
that there are hidden costs to turn consumer away, the prediction of a high level of
price should be observable in practice. On the other hand, the model allows to discuss,
from a more normative point of view, the consequences of including, in a regulated
market an obligation for the firms to serve all the incoming demand. In this case,
the negative effect of higher prices should be put in balance with potential gains for
consumers for not being rationed.
The question of the robustness of our results with respect to some of the simplifying
assumptions we made can be considered. What happens when firms use different
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technologies. What happens when a new firm arrives on an existing market? What
happens if uncertainty (about demand, costs, etc.) is introduced into the model? What
happens if dynamic effects are included? The textbook example that we provide here
is sufficiently striking to prove that it is worth pursuing.
Appendix A- Proof of Lemma 1 to 5
Proof of Lemma 1
Implicit differentiation of v̂ yields Equations (2) to (6).
The quasi-concavity of f means that:
−v̂zzv̂2y + 2v̂zyv̂zv̂y − v̂yyv̂2z = fzzfv < 0 (14)
This proves that v is quasi-convex.
Moreover, it is easy to check that:
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v̂yy v̂yz
v̂zy v̂zz
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
1
f 4v
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
fzz fzv
fvz fvv
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
If f is concave then this determinant is necessarily positive. The second order pure
derivatives of v̂ are also positive (cf. (4) and (5)), proving part 2) of the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2
The first step is to expand Ω and Ωp
Ω(p, z,m) =
(
m− 1
m
)
D(p)p− w2
(
v̂(D(p), z)− v̂
(
D(p)
m
, z
))
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Differentiating gives:
Ωp(p, z,m)
=
(
m− 1
m
)
D(p) +D′(p)
[
p− w2v̂y(D(p), z)−
1
m
(
p− w2v̂y
(
D(p)
m
, z
))] (15)
We are now going to prove existence.
For a given z and m, Ω(0, z,m) = −w2
(
v̂(Qmax, z)− v̂
(
Qmax
m
, z
))
< 0 (because v̂y >
0 and Qmax > Qmax/m). We also have Ω(pmax, z,m) = 0 with Ωp−(pmax, z,m) =
D′−(pmax)
m−1
m
pmax < 0 (with D
′− being the left derivative of the demand function). Ω
is continuous in p over the interval [0, pmax], initially negative and finally converging to
zero from above. This implies that there is necessarily a p̄(z,m) ∈ (0, pmax) that solves
Ω(p, z,m) = 0
We now prove the uniqueness of p̄(z,m) in (0, pmax). Over this interval, we have
D(p) > D(p)/m > 0. Moreover, the strict convexity of v̂ implies that:
v̂y
(
D(p)
m
, z
)
<
v̂(D(p), z)− v̂
(
D(p)
m
, z
)
D(p)− D(p)
m
< v̂y(D(p), z)
From the definition of p̄, m−1
m
D(p̄)p̄ = w2
(
v̂(D(p̄), z)− v̂
(
D(p̄)
m
, z
))
and thus
w2v̂y
(
D(p̄)
m
, z
)
< p̄ < w2v̂y(D(p̄), z) (16)
Finally, considering Equation (15), it is now obvious that Ωp(p̄, z,m) > 0. This means
that, in the interval (0, pmax), Ω can only intercept the x-axis from below. And since
Ω is a continuous functions, this can only happen once.
Proof of Lemma 3
It is easy to check that π̂(0, z,m) < −w1z, π̂(pmax, z,m) = −w1z and π̂p−(pmax, z,m) <
0. Then, the strict concavity of π̂ in p implies that p̂ exists and is unique. Implicit
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differentiation of π̂ for a given z yields
dp̂
dm
∣∣∣∣
dz=0
=
1
m
D(p̂)
(
p̂− w2v̂y
(
D(p̂)
m
, z
))
D(p̂) +D′(p̂)(p̂− w2v̂y(D(p̂)m , z))
< 0 (17)
For p < pmax, we have
D(p)
m
> D(pmax) = 0. The strict convexity of v̂ then im-
plies that v̂
(
D(p)
m
, z
)
− 0 <
(
D(p)
m
− 0
)
v̂y
(
D(p)
m
, z
)
. By definition, p̂ is such that
p̂D(p̂)
m
= w2v̂
(
D(p̂)
m
, z
)
and then p̂ < w2v̂y
(
D(p̂)
m
, z
)
, which gives the sign of the implicit
derivative and proves that p̂ decreases with m. Thus, for m ≥ 2, p̂(z,m) < p̂(z, 1)
and π̂(p̂(z,m), z, 1) < −w1z. It follows that for m ≥ 2, Ω(p̂(z,m), z,m) < 0, implying
p̂(z,m) < p̄(z,m) .
Proof of Lemma 4
It is easy to verify that π̂p(0, z,m) > 0 and π̂p−(pmax, z,m) < 0. π̂p is continuous,
ensuring that the program has an interior maximum. The strict concavity of π̂ with p
ensures that the maximum is unique. Because π̂p(p̂, z,m) > 0, p
∗(z,m) > p̂(z,m)
Proof of Lemma 5
At p̂, D(p̂)
m
p̂− w2v̂(D(p̂)m , z) = 0.
The derivative of the above expression with respect to z is:
dp̂
dz
∣∣∣∣
dm=0
=
w2v̂z(
D(p̂)
m
, z)
D′(p̂)
m
p̂+ D(p̂)
m
− w2D
′(p̂)
m
v̂y(
D(p̂)
m
, z)
< 0
From Equation (17), we have
dp̂
dm
∣∣∣∣
dz=0
< 0
At p̄, we have Ω(p̄, z,m) = 0. The derivatives of the above equality with respect to z
and m are:
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dp̄
dz
∣∣∣∣
dm=0
= −Ωz(p̄, z,m)
Ωp(p̄, z,m)
=
w2
(
v̂z(D(p̄), z)− v̂z(D(p̄)m , z)
)
Ωp(p̄, z,m)
which is < 0 since Ωp(p̄, z,m) > 0 and v̂z < 0, v̂yz < 0.
dp̄
dm
∣∣∣∣
dz=0
= −Ωm(p̄, z,m)
Ωp(p̄, z,m)
= −
D(p̄)
m2
(p̄− w2v̂y(D(p̄)m , z))
Ωp(p̄, z,m)
which is < 0 since Ωp(p̄, z,m) > 0 and from Equation (16), p̄ > w2v̂y(
D(p̄)
m
, z).
Finally, we obtain,
dp∗
dz
∣∣∣∣
dm=0
= − π̂pz(p
∗, z,m)
π̂pp(p∗, z,m)
= w2
D′(p∗)
m
v̂yz(
D(p∗)
m
, z)
π̂pp(p∗, z,m)
< 0
and
dp∗
dm
∣∣∣∣
dz=0
= − π̂pm(p
∗, z,m)
π̂pp(p∗, z,m)
= −w2
D′(p∗)
m3
D(p∗)v̂yy(
D(p∗)
m
, z)
π̂pp(p∗, z,m)
< 0
Appendix B- Proof of Proposition 1
Methodological statement
1. Price competition is cursed by discontinuity of the payoff function in the vicinity
of the equilibrium. In the literature, the use of mixed strategies solve partially
the problem. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) provide some results that, relying on
weaker forms of continuity, prove the existence and uniqueness of mixed strategies
equilibria for certain class of discontinuous game that can be applied to price
competition with capacity constraint. In this paper, we address the problem of
the existence of pure strategies equilibria in line with Dastidar (1995). We want to
point out the methodological switch he proposes, restarting the reasoning from
scratch, relying only on the definition of Nash Equilibrium, a definition that
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requires no assumption of any kind for continuity of the payoff function.8 Within
this approach, the only requirement is to build a clever partition of the outcome
space, that allows to test for a finite number of class of unilateral profitable
deviations from any possible outcome. To solve the equilibrium in the second
stage, we adopt exactly the same line of reasoning, and the purpose of Lemma 2
to 5 is to provide this “clever” partition of the outcomes space.
2. However, conversely to Dastidar (1995), as most models of capacity constraint,
our model is a sequential two stage game, with firms playing simultaneously
at each stage, i.e. a game of imperfect information. Moreover, conversely to
the approach in mixed strategies, we have a multiplicity of the equilibria in the
second stage instead of uniqueness, a property that makes impossible to reduce
the whole game to a simple strategic one. Our innovation to resolve this problem
is thus to extend the Dastidarian methodological move to the case of Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
3. We know that, in general, in a sequential game of complete but imperfect in-
formation, when we have multiplicity of equilibria in some subgame, subgame
perfection may failed to achieve sensible equilibrium prediction. It is usual in
this case to introduce more sophisticated equilibrium concept and refinement re-
lying on some kink of belief or expectation rules, etc.. However in our special
setting, despite the multiplicity of equilibria, some subgame perfect equilibria
exists and we will base our equilibrium prediction on this underlying concept.
1. Core of the proof of Proposition 1
An outcome (~z e, ~p e) with ~z e = (z e1 , · · · , z en) and ~p e = (p e1 , · · · , p en) is a Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium if and only if:
8It is also important to emphasise that many considerations on the existence on the equilibrium
in price competition with pure strategies take their roots in Edgeworth (1925), in a time in which the
notion of Nash Equilibrium does not even exist.
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1. (~z e, ~p e) is an Nash equilibrium in price in the second stage (the bold notation
indicates that the value is given at the stage of reasoning):
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n},∀pi ∈ [0, pmax], πi(p ei , ~p e−i,~z e) ≥ πi(pi, ~p e−i,~z e)
and 2. (~z e, ~p e) is an Nash equilibrium of the whole game:
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, ∀pi ∈ [0, pmax],∀zi ∈ R+, πi((z ei , p ei ),~z e−i, ~p e−i) ≥ πi((zi, pi),~z e−i, ~p e−i)
We are interested in outcomes in which all n firms operate in the market, meaning that
we consider the possibility for an outcome in which all firms are setting the same price
pN to be SPNE.
Step 1: pN has to be a Nash equilibrium in the second stage. The firms have no in-
centive to unilaterally deviate in the second stage as long as pN ∈
⋂
i
[p̂(zi, n), p̄(zi, n)] 6=
∅. In other words the necessity for the outcome to be a Nash equilibrium in price in
the second stage prevent the possibility for the firms to play too different levels of
fixed factor in the first stage. More precisely, for all i, zi has to belong in the inter-
val [z̄(pN , n), ẑ(pN , n)] with z̄(pN , n) such that p̄(z, n) = pN and ẑ(pN , n) such that
p̂(z, n) = pN (that are both unique, thanks to Lemma 5).
Among all the outcomes that are Nash equilibria in the second stage (Step 1), with
all firms operating the market, we are now going to eliminate those who are subject
to profitable unilateral deviation in stage 1. Because the strategy of player i in stage
1 is of dimension 2, firms can deviate in either dimension or both and we will have to
consider all the possible deviations.
Step 2: By definition of program P1 (p, n):
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n},∀zi, z−i ∈ [z̄(pN , n), ẑ(pN , n)],
πi((z
∗(pN , n), pN),~z−i, ~p
N
−i) ≥ πi((zi, pN),~z−i, ~pN−i)
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It means that for firm i, the strategy (zN , pN) (with zN = z∗(pN , n)) played in the
first stage dominates all other strategy that lead to pN being a Nash Equilibria in
the second stage with all firm operating the market. All the firms having the same
technology, we conclude that a necessary condition for an outcome of the game with all
n firms quoting pN to be a SPNE is that all firms choose the same level of fixed factor
(z∗(pN , n) solution of P1 (p, n). That correspond to the first condition (i.e. optimality
condition) of Proposition 1.
Step 3: Now we are going to test if an outcome in which all firms play (z∗(pN , n), pN)
is subject to profitable unilateral deviation (zd, pd) by firm i, with pd 6= pN , under
condition that pd can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in the second stage (not
necessarily with all firms operating the market).
Step 3.1 Let us start by all the unilateral deviation such that: zd ∈ R+ and
pd ∈ (pN , pmax]. In this case the firm sells nothing and the profit is −w1zd. The
“best” of these unilateral deviation is zd = 0 that earns zero profit. This deviation
is not profitable as long as π̂(pN , zN , n) ≥ 0. That impose the second condition (i.e.
profitability) of Proposition 1
Step 3.2 Let us start by all the unilateral deviation such that: zd ∈ R+ and pd ∈
[0, p̂(zN , n)). In this case the firm will operate the market alone in the second stage.
The profit corresponding to these unilaterally deviating strategies are upper bounded
by profit corresponding to (argmax
z
, π̂(p̂(zN , n), z, 1), 1), p̂(zN , n)). That correspond
to the third condition (i.e. non-existence of limit pricing strategy) of Proposition 1
All those conditions are necessary for having a SNPE and must be satisfied simul-
taneously.
2. Core of the proof of Proposition 2
We start with an outcome that verifies all the three conditions of Proposition 1 and
we consider remaining possible deviations.
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Step 3.3 Finally, let us consider the case with pd ∈ [p̂(zN , n), pN) and zd ∈ R+.
The case zd < z̄(pd, n) or zd > ẑ(pN , n) can be excluded because they are incompatible
with the possibility for pd to be sustain as a Nash equilibrium in the second stage.
For a given pd, all the remaining unilateral deviations of that kind are dominated by
(z∗(pd, n), pd). Thus as long as: ∀p ∈ [p̂(zN , n), pN), π(pN , z∗(pN , n), n) def= Π(pN , n) ≥
π(p, z∗(p, n), n)
def
= Π(p, n) these unilateral deviations are unprofitable.
Step 4: When the supplementary condition of Proposition 2 is satisfied, Step 2, 3.1,
3.2, 3.3 define necessary conditions for (zN , pN) to be a SPNE with all firms operating
the market. But taken together they exhausts all the possible case implying that they
are also sufficient.
Remark: The condition described in case 3.3 is operative only for outcomes asso-
ciated with the non-decreasing part (in p) of the function Π. For outcomes associated
with the decreasing part (in p) of Π subgame perfection is not powerful enough to
obtain an equilibrium, even if those outcomes can be appropriately ranked relying on
function Π. And of course they will be dominated by the outcome that is associated
with the price p that maximizes Π for a given n, which is a SPNE. That will be the
core argument of proposition 3.
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